The most read: US Indo-Pacific Strategy, MCC and Nepal
China’s Power makes it different from others – Cynthia Watson
View from Nepal: India and China’s high level visits to Nepal, 12/01/2020
Saurav Raj Panta
Development Projects, Defense and Diplomacy
Indian Foreign Secretary(IFS) Harsh Vardhan Shringala visit to Nepal (November 26-27,2020) is a “ice breaking” for 1 year long deadlock in bilateral relations. IFS presented himself in a “liberal approach” and re-stressed the need of Nepal-Indo ties. IFS virtually inaugurated Monasteries in Gorkha and Manang districts, had even travelled to Gorkha for inaugurating three schools constructed with the Indian reconstruction assistance. With the Indian Government, US$50 million assistance; earthquake resilience schools were constructed in nine districts of Nepal (Gorkha, Nuwakot, Sindhupalchowk, Ramechhap, Dolakha, Kavrepalanchowk, Dhading and Kathmandu). Except Kathmandu and Ramechhap, all of the districts shares border with Tibetan Autonomous Region of China. Kathmandu and Ramechhap has also significant numbers of Chinese presence.
After 2 days of IFS visit to Nepal, Chinese Stat Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe visited Nepal on November 29, 2020. His 1 day visit focused around strengthening military ties and buzzed for a “strategic partnership” which is very crucial in current time when India-US had already military 2+2 partnership. This shows, China wants similar type of 2+2 partnership with Nepal. He also ‘indirectly’ alert and appreciated Nepal by upholding of the One-China policy after 2 days when IFS had inaugurated Monasteries of Gorkha and Manang; perceived as one of the supporters of Dalai Lama.
So, Indian development projects are active around the areas that border Nepal-China. Even India side supporting developments of Monastry in Manang(which is symbolic for CIA covert operation of Khampas movement to Chinese). Chinese interest for strengthening bilateral ties via activating “military” content at a time of US-India 2+2 partnership and QUAD advancement; signifies the intensity of these 2 countries geopolitical game in Nepal . Both Indian and Chinese are using Development, Diplomacy and Defense(3D) as a core fundamental principles to achieve their vested interest in Nepal. The time has come for Nepali leaders to act wisely.
Saurav Panta is the President of Garjan Nepal and is PhD candidate at Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal. He is Associate at Nepal Matters for America.
Link to the article: East Asia Forum
After upwards of 80 international trips, Chinese President Xi Jinping finally visited his South Asian neighbour, Nepal. The primary motive behind Xi’s visit was not China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but rather the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Despite the United States’ efforts, Nepal is hesitant to endorse the Indo-Pacific strategy. Meanwhile, Nepal signed a memorandum of understanding with China to cooperate on the BRI in 2017, but not a single BRI project has taken off in Nepal.
At the time of signing on to the BRI, Nepal’s ruling Communist Party seemed either unaware or deliberately downplayed the geopolitical implications of subscribing to China’s initiative that has gone on to challenge the US-led global order. Indeed, a year later, Nepal’s Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali was invited to Washington where Secretary of State Mike Pompeo offered Nepal a ‘central role’ in the US Indo-Pacific strategy. This was the first Nepal–US state visit of that level in 17 years.
In Nepal, the US Indo-Pacific strategy was immediately perceived as a strategy to use Nepal to contain China. For Nepal’s part, its long-standing endorsement of the ‘One China policy’, especially regarding Tibet, works as the foundation of a healthy relationship. Time and again, Nepal has come under pressure to provide a safe passage for Tibetan refugees to India — a long-standing US policy priority in Nepal. In this regard, the US Indo-Pacific policy has only amplified traditional concerns.
The Indo-Pacific strategy was not welcomed in Nepal for two additional reasons.
First, the ‘Indo’ part of the strategy that refers to India’s role in Asia is at odds with Nepal’s strong desire to reduce its dependence on India. Perhaps the strongest reason why there is support for China in Nepal, including among politicians, bureaucrats and members of the press, is Nepal’s experience with India.
Endorsing the US strategy would risk Nepal shooting itself in the foot by indirectly supporting Indian dominance in South Asia. It also feeds into Nepal’s fear that acquiescing to such pressures may destabilise the country. To be sure, India’s vision of the region differs from the US Indo-Pacific version and India–US relations are multilayered. Yet, India’s vision ensures that it remains the pre-eminent player in South Asia.
Second, while the United States and other liberal democracies and organisations have pursued the promotion of democracy and human rights in the international community, some of their policies, particularly on ethnic politics and secularism, have caused misunderstandings. Most Nepalese believe that external pressures in these areas have undermined Nepal’s identity and compromised its economic growth and development.
Meanwhile, building upon their long-standing friendly ties, China has cautiously extended its arms to Nepal in order to gain goodwill. China offered financial aid to Nepal’s security bodies to enhance cooperation and has cemented party-to-party relations by increasing interactions, visits and financial aid for development projects.
Nepal–US diplomacy appears to be under stress despite the United States being a major partner of Nepal’s communist government. Nepal’s government has yet to officially accept a US$500 million grant from the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) that has already been signed by both countries but was later tied to the Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, per the MCC conditions, for the agreement to enter into force, Nepal must obtain Indian consent on operational and financial details in order to fund a cross-border transmission line between Nepal and India. This only reinforces Nepal’s apprehension towards the US Indo-Pacific strategy.
Some argue that the main issue is that radical constituents of Nepal’s ruling party blocked the parliament from moving forward with endorsing the MCC grant. Despite Nepal’s policy of ‘amity with all and enmity with none’, experts in Kathmandu are concerned that the country is becoming too politically correct when it comes to China and that there is a lack of critical observation.
By building upon long-standing ties with the Nepali army and maintaining several diplomatic advantages over China, the United States remains in the game.
President Xi’s visit to Nepal comes as the country’s conditions are in China’s favour. Nepal’s current government is stable and, therefore, has a better chance of implementing agreements. Xi’s visit has also been taken by Nepalis as an elevation of Nepal’s stature in the international community, particularly given Nepali President Bidhya Devi Bhandari’s state visit to Beijing during the BRI Forum this year. During this visit, Xi also seized the opportunity at a now widely reported on press conference to warn ‘external forces’ that he believed to be seeking to divide China.
Most importantly, Xi and Nepali Prime Minister KP Oli agreed to elevate the Nepal–China relationship to a ‘strategic partnership’. This, arguably, immediately prompted a response in Washington as the acting Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Alice Wells commented that ‘Chinese influence has grown in Nepal’.
Nepali politicians should understand that growing ties with China must not lead to an undermining of the universal values of democracy and freedom. The international community must come to terms with the reality of China’s rise and how it will inevitably impact the trans-Himalayan order. This will require an understanding of Nepal’s interests and concerns.
Photo: Xi Jinping and Bidya Bhandari, Reuters/Mathema
Dr Anil Sigdel is Director at Nepal Matters for America, Washington DC
The article cited in the book: China’s maritime silk road